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Democratic Decentralisation, 
Clientelism and Local Taxation 
in Ghana*
Richard C. Crook
Abstract It is generally assumed by advocates of democratic decentralisation 
that maximising locally-raised revenue sources will help to enhance 
accountability through a closer and more legitimate relationship between 
the local government authority and citizens. Research on Ghana and other 
African countries shows, however, that the dominance of clientelist forms 
of politics undermines the legitimacy of local taxation; where voters expect 
their representatives to provide specific pay-backs to themselves or their 
communities in return for support and payment of tax, it is extremely 
difficult to establish a ‘collective interest’ for the local government area. 
Citizens tend to interpret allocation decisions over expenditure of revenues 
as products of patronage relations rather than as a collective public good. 
This problem is especially acute where resources are very scarce and the 
revenue base limited. Central government transfers are, therefore, likely to 
remain the fairest and most effective way of financing local government in 
such contexts.
Keywords: democratic decentralisation, Ghana, clientelism, taxation, 
local revenue, intergovernmental transfers.
1 Introduction: accountability and central vs local revenue sources
One of  the most commonly recognised problems of  local or 
decentralised government in less developed countries is lack of  resources 
to carry out their basic functions and services – the so-called ‘unfunded 
mandates’ or ‘responsibility-resource gap’ (Dafflon 2013). How to fund 
decentralised government in poor or developing countries is the subject 
of  a continuing debate between those who argue that decentralisation 
should seek to maximise locally-raised revenue, and those who argue 
that central government transfers are the only realistic and equitable 
way to ensure adequate resources, even if  those transfers become the 
dominant source of  revenues.1
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The main arguments in favour of  central government funding are:
 l In countries where the majority of  the population live in poor rural 
areas, there are extreme inequalities of  tax base resources; outside 
the major cities, most local authorities suffer from an inherent 
poverty of  resources such that improvements in local tax mobilisation 
will only improve revenues ‘at the margin’, and can rarely provide 
sufficient funds to carry out their mandated functions (Aziz and 
Arnold 1996; Dafflon 2013; Davey 1994).
 l Attempts to substantially increase local taxation in such 
circumstances will therefore inevitably run into political resistance, 
especially where there is already a ‘vicious circle’ of  poor 
performance caused by lack of  resources and unwillingness to pay 
tax when there are no perceived benefits.
 l Central government funding is therefore essential for ‘pump-priming’ 
the resources of  local authorities, enabling them to provide the 
services they are expected to provide.
 l Central government funding is also essential to equalise resources 
and redistribute to poorer areas, using the usual device of  a 
‘distributable pool’ of  national revenues, as well as earmarked and 
matching grants (Bahl and Linn 1994; Dafflon 2013).
 l Concerns over the autonomy of  local governments which are highly 
dependent on central government can be dealt with through legal 
and administrative devices which guarantee stable, assured funding 
and permit expenditure autonomy. What is required is a good 
balance between mechanisms of  central monitoring and auditing on 
the one hand, and an adequate flow of  block grants, combined with 
targeted funds for generic areas.
The main argument for central funding therefore rests on the assertion 
that the source of  funding for local government is less important than 
its adequacy for the functions allocated, and how it is controlled and 
monitored, including the role of  political accountability mechanisms at 
local level.
Those in favour of  maximising local revenue mobilisation base their 
arguments primarily on the desirability of  enhanced accountability 
of  government, linked with democratic decentralisation. The main 
assumptions are as follows:
 l Internalisation of  costs and benefits: the greater the proportion 
of  local revenue in the total revenue of  a local authority, the more 
closely the costs and benefits are restricted to local residents.
 l This, combined with the greater proximity of  decision-makers 
to local citizens and their demands, leads to greater ‘allocative 
efficiency’ of  service provision and development expenditure, since 
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local citizens will only demand what they are really prepared to pay 
for (Bird 1994; Tanzi 1995; World Bank 2004).
 l Citizens’ demands (through the ‘long route of  accountability’ – World 
Bank 2004) will also be heard better because of  the democratic 
accountability of  elected representatives as well as other participatory 
devices; this will make local government more responsive to 
local needs, particularly those of  the mass of  poor citizens, and 
improve local service provision. Indeed, it has been argued that 
over-dependence on central government transfers, especially in 
resource-poor areas which benefit from equalisation grants, is likely to 
create ‘rentier’ sub-national governments which do not have to engage 
democratically with local citizens because they are under no pressure 
to impose taxes (Gervasoni 2010). (This is a variant of  the argument 
that governments which need to tax their citizens will naturally 
develop a more accountable and reciprocal relationship with them, 
which is more likely to be sustained by democratic representation – 
see Brautigam, Fjeldstad and Moore 2008.)
 l Improved accountability and responsiveness will therefore enhance 
the legitimacy of  local taxation, given its more direct link to 
perceived benefits, and will create a ‘virtuous circle’ in which more 
responsive services will encourage more tax paying, and lead to 
further increases in revenue.
 l Local governments which raise a greater share of  their total revenue 
from local sources will also become more autonomous and have 
greater discretion over expenditure decisions than those which 
are heavily dependent on transferred revenues. This again results 
in a mutual reinforcement of  local accountability and responsive 
expenditure patterns.
In this article, some of  the assumptions underlying the advocacy of  
maximising local revenue mobilisation will be challenged, focusing 
particularly on the alleged link between democratic representation, 
greater willingness to pay local taxes, and improvements in the provision 
of  public goods including investment in pro-poor development 
programmes. The key institution linking government and citizens in 
this context is that of  the elected representative. To what extent does 
accountability through elections really ensure that local governments 
will be able to improve local tax mobilisation, and produce more 
developmental outputs? And what do citizens in today’s poor or 
developing countries actually demand of  their local representatives? 
The ‘principal-agent’ models popular with development analysts and 
donor agencies tend to assume that citizens as ‘principals’ will demand 
collective or ‘developmental’ public goods and accountability for 
expenditure decisions. But this is not necessarily the case (cf. Booth 2012).
These questions will be examined through a review of  the experience 
of  democratic decentralisation in Ghana, with some comparative 
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observations on other African and Asian countries, including a 
rather different form of  decentralisation in Côte d’Ivoire based on a 
Francophone model of  local government. These cases show that even 
after many years of  consolidated democratic local government, there 
are still enormous problems with local tax mobilisation, and with the 
developmental responsiveness of  the local authorities. The problems 
derive primarily from the role of  representatives in societies dominated by 
a patron–client form of  political competition, and also from the logic of  
the particular forms of  electoral representation which have been adopted.
2 The Ghana District Assemblies
2.1 Formal structures and functions
Ghana’s District Assembly system was introduced in 1989 by the then 
military government of  Jerry Rawlings. The ‘Rawlings Revolution’ of  
1981 was based on radical populist ideas of  direct participation and 
no-party people’s democracy (inspired partly by Gaddafi’s Libya), and 
the decentralisation reform of  1989 was portrayed as a fulfilment of  
that commitment to introduce a ‘truly Ghanaian’ form of  grass-roots 
democracy. With the transition to a more conventional, representative 
multiparty democracy in 1992, the District Assemblies (DAs) were 
incorporated into the 1992 Constitution of  the Fourth Republic and are 
now governed by the Local Government Act of  1993. Politically, the 
reform was clearly an attempt to create a rural power base for Rawlings, 
embodying as it did a privileged position for pro-Rawlings ‘revolutionary 
organisations’ (which later became the core of  his party, the National 
Democratic Congress (NDC)), and mechanisms for co-opting rural 
business, professional and agrarian elites (see Crook and Manor 1998).
There are now 216 Assemblies, ranging from 170 rural DAs with 
populations ranging from 75,000 to 250,000–300,000, to 40 Municipal 
Assemblies for towns with populations of  over 95,000, and six 
Metropolitan Assemblies for the large cities including the capital Accra, 
population 2.4 million. Their primary function is to be responsible for 
the ‘overall development of  the district’, together with a very wide range 
of  specific service responsibilities. In the rural DAs, these are mainly the 
provision of  educational and health infrastructures, minor roads, public 
works, markets, town planning and other projects.
Administratively, they are a mixed form of  decentralisation in that their 
other main function is to supervise the various former line ministries 
which have been deconcentrated to district level since 1989, to form 
an integrated district governmental and financial apparatus. They are 
therefore responsible for drawing up an overall District Plan and a 
composite District Budget, although this remains problematic even after 
27 years of  operation. The district is administered, not by an elected 
mayor, but by a centrally appointed official, the District Chief  Executive 
(DCE), who is normally a political activist loyal to the government of  
the day, assisted by a small group of  senior civil service administrators 
and technical officers. Other staff (e.g. revenue collectors, drivers, clerks, 
labourers) are employed locally.
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2.2 DA funding
Since 1994, the majority of  funding for the DAs (currently around 
82 per cent overall) has come from central government transfers 
(Gilbert, Hugounenq and Vaillancourt 2013); this represents a 
continuing trend towards increases in both the absolute amounts and 
the proportion of  funding coming from central government or external 
sources, which, as will be argued, is linked to the political imperatives 
of  democratic decentralisation. The main funding source is the District 
Assemblies Common Fund (DACF), a distributable pool account 
which is allocated 7.5 per cent of  national government revenues; 
other elements come from the District Development Fund (DDF) (a 
channel for donor funds), Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) 
funds, royalties from natural resources and customary land rents, and 
government payment of  some district staff salaries. The largest source 
of  local revenues is ‘fees and charges’ which includes local business 
taxes, followed by licences and property tax (Table 1).
2.3 Democracy and the political context
Rawlings’ original populist vision of  the DAs was that they would build 
a genuinely grass-roots form of  participatory democracy which would 
focus on ‘community-based forms of  self-reliant economic and social 
development’ (or ‘self-help’, as it is called in Ghana). Rawlings was 
especially hostile to liberal, multiparty-based competitive politics, which 
he saw as an inappropriate, colonial imposition on African societies, 
and a harmful distraction from building communal consensus around 
practical development measures. Hence the ban on parties in local 
elections, which not only echoed the Libyan system, but was similar 
Table 1 Breakdown of District Assembly funding sources (national aggregates)
Central government transfers %
DACF 44
DDF (donors) 25
HIPC funds 17
Government salary payments 11
Ministry sector grants 3
Local revenues %
Fees and charges 34
Licences 20
Property tax 18
Permits and land 14
Miscellaneous (poll tax, special levies, trading services, etc) 14
Source Gilbert et al. (2013).
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to the Ugandan system introduced by Museveni’s ex-guerrilla army 
National Resistance Movement (NRM) regime in 1986 (Crook 1999). 
(A similar approach has characterised other authoritarian regimes 
which have resisted political competition at the national level, such as 
Bangladesh under Ershad, or Pakistan under Musharraf).
These participatory aspirations were embodied in the democratic 
institutions of  the DAs at both district and sub-district levels. At the 
lowest level, there are elected Unit Committees for every group of  
500 electors (in practice, villages and quarters); above them are Area 
and Town Councils, not directly elected but composed of  DA-elected 
members for those areas.
At the district level, which because of  the size of  the DAs has necessarily 
to be a form of  representative politics, there are Assemblies which 
consist of  two thirds-elected Assembly Members (AMs), elected by 
‘first-past-the-post’ elections as single members for very small wards. 
The average ratio of  AMs to electors is 1: 2,000; in the two case 
study districts studied by Crook and Manor in the 1990s (East Akim 
and East Mamprusi), the ratios were 1:1,800 and 1:2,200 (Crook 
and Manor 1998). This was clearly designed to foster a very close 
and direct relationship between elected AMs and their constituents. 
Together with the one third of  AMs appointed by government on local 
recommendations, this has produced relatively large Assemblies, for 
example 79 members for East Akim and 69 for East Mamprusi, with 
populations in the 1990s of  209,710 and 183,839 respectively.
The original political context of  the DAs changed substantially after 
1992, following Rawlings’ acceptance of  the need to move to a 
multiparty, constitutional democracy with an elected executive president 
and national Parliament. Rawlings secured his continuation in power for 
another eight years through his NDC party, which used his incumbent 
power to mobilise support; control of  the resources of  the rural DAs 
through his loyal DCEs and his Committees for the Defence of  the 
Revolution (CDRs) played a significant part in the election victories of  
1992 and 1996. After the opposition, the New Patriotic Party (NPP), 
won power in 2000, Ghana became established as a relatively stable 
two-party competitive democracy, with the NDC returning to power 
in 2008. The two main parties represent two competing ‘political 
traditions’ associated with both class and regional power bases; the 
NPP is descended from the conservative nationalist movement of  the 
1950s, which had its main power bases in the southern Akan regions 
of  Eastern and Ashanti, and is based on traditional elites and the 
established business and professional classes. The NDC grew out of  
Rawlings’ more radical, anti-establishment movement which looks back 
to the Nkrumah era of  state socialism and is especially strong in the 
northern and Volta (south-eastern) regions.
Nevertheless, in spite of  these broad historic differences, both parties 
have adapted to multiparty democracy since 1992 in similar ways, 
IDS Bulletin Vol. 48 No. 2 March 2017: ‘Interrogating Decentralisation in Africa’ 15–30 | 21
Institute of Development Studies | bulletin.ids.ac.uk
to construct what Whitfield has called a system of  ‘competitive 
clientelism’ (Whitfield 2011). This system is built on the ‘mercantilist’ 
nature of  the economy. Ghana’s economy still depends mainly on 
the export of  primary commodities such as gold, timber and cocoa 
grown by small/middle farmers, and more recently, crude oil. The 
state’s revenues are drawn from the rents it extracts from the export/
import economy, and the domestic business classes are relatively 
weak and small. Whichever party controls power uses access to state 
contracts and other opportunities to reward its supporters, creating 
a dependent or client business class, those who have ‘invested’ in the 
party’s victory. Competition for power is a zero-sum game for those who 
depend on political patronage. And winning elections is therefore an 
essential prerequisite for sustaining these patronage machines. Parties, 
which are quite weakly organised and factionalised, also depend on 
regional and local elites to invest in securing election victories, and are 
expected to reward victorious MPs as well as the party’s ‘foot soldiers’ at 
constituency level after an election win.
Most importantly, these expectations of  the purpose of  elections and the 
use of  political power are generally shared by voters. One study of  MPs 
in competitive and non-competitive constituencies found that 70 per cent 
of  voters voted for their preferred candidate on the expectation that 
they would be able to provide specific local development projects or job 
opportunities (so-called ‘club goods’); 15 per cent expected personal 
benefits to be given out during the election campaign, and further rewards 
for particular forms of  support. (These expectations were higher in the 
more competitive constituencies; Lindberg 2003, 2010.) To be successful 
(and re-elected), MPs therefore have to cultivate clientelist links with 
higher levels of  the party and government ministers if  they are to deliver 
on their patronage promises; they also need to generate pay-back for 
their ‘investment’, through kick-backs on brokering access to government 
contracts and other useful opportunities. Voters themselves (especially 
‘swing’ voters) therefore vote on clientelist principles, rather than choosing 
parties or representatives who will provide more programmatic public 
goods (cf. Keefer and Khemani 2005; Levy and Kpundeh 2004; van de 
Walle 2012; Vicente and Wantchekon 2009). It is the clientelist basis of  
relations between voters and their representatives, and between citizens 
and government authorities, which seriously undermines the notion 
that democracy will produce governments which are more directly 
accountable to citizens for the way they spend public money, or that will 
spend more on redistributive developmental policies, even if  the funds are 
the product of  general taxation rather than ‘rents’.2
2.4 Representative democracy and clientelism at the local level
The clientelist assumptions of  voters are reproduced at the local level in 
the politics of  the DAs. Indeed, they have been officially acknowledged 
in the 6 per cent share of  the DACF which was allocated to MPs to 
be spent on ‘Constituency Development’, or projects they choose for 
their constituencies as a way of  fulfilling constituents’ expectations 
(Lindberg 2009). MPs are also included in the DA as ex officio members, 
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and can therefore bring their political concerns to bear on DA planning 
and spending.
In the election of  AMs, the no-party rule and the very close, grass-roots 
character of  the representation offered by AMs has strongly reinforced 
the idea that the Assembly representative is a delegate of  his or her 
specific community – a ward of  one or two villages, with only a few 
thousand electors. The rules for the election of  an AM limit the number 
of  candidates to five; they must be resident in the district (to exclude 
absentee urban elites), and have to stand on their ‘personal merit, 
integrity and proven participation in community development’ (Crook 
1999). The government then organises and funds a three-week period 
of  public hustings at which the candidates present their ‘life histories’ 
and manifestos, and take questions from the public. Once elected, one 
of  their official duties is to encourage and develop ‘self-help’ projects in 
their communities. And they have a duty to maintain regular contact with 
their constituents. The record of  the elected AMs in developing good 
participatory relationships was in fact quite good for the first few years 
of  the new system. In the districts studied by Crook and Manor in 1992, 
3.83 per cent of  electors could name their AM, 32 per cent said they had 
attended a meeting with their AM, and 12 per cent had contacted their 
AM individually, which in comparative terms is quite impressive. The 
first elections for the DAs were also met with enthusiasm, as reflected in 
the 58 per cent turnout (Crook and Manor 1998).
The pressure on such representatives to fight for projects for their 
own areas, and assistance with their self-help projects is clearly very 
strong. The DAs have therefore become arenas in which there is little 
debate over development policy for the district as a whole; instead, 
they are battlegrounds over the allocation of  whatever resources are 
available to the communities represented by each of  the AMs. In a 
situation of  extreme scarcity and inadequate revenue sources, only a 
very few of  the hundreds of  villages or towns within a district can be 
offered any development project in any single year.3 And in a political 
system dominated by patron–client linkages, whatever decision is taken 
will be interpreted (whether rightly or wrongly) by the unlucky ones 
as a consequence of  the greater ‘influence’ or patronage connection 
of  that community’s representative; maybe he or she is close to the 
DCE, the MP and the ruling party in the district, or other influential 
government officials and ‘big men’ in the area. (Similar problems have 
been reported from Uganda: in one study of  local primary health-care 
services, citizens did not bother to complain about poor service, or 
use ‘participatory’ user complaint mechanisms because they believed 
that local councillors were involved in corrupt patronage relationships 
with clinic staff, and therefore complaints would never be listened to 
fairly (Golooba-Mutebi 2005).) With the growing intensity of  party 
competition after 2000, it also become more plausible to suspect 
that communities which were known not to have voted for the ruling 
party in Parliamentary elections were being discriminated against in 
development expenditure decisions.
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2.5 Community representation and the legitimacy of local taxation
One of  the consequences of  such a system, dominated by strong 
community representation and clientelist politics, is that it undermines 
the legitimacy of  local taxation, and makes it increasingly difficult 
to improve local revenue mobilisation. Where the fairness of  district 
allocations of  expenditures is constantly challenged, it is difficult to create 
a sense of  the ‘collective interest’ of  the district, and hence acceptance 
of  the idea that taxation is for the general good. It is here that clientelist 
politics has its most damaging effect, insofar as it makes the link between 
democratic representation and acceptance of  local taxation difficult to 
sustain, and therefore undermines any move to reduce dependence on 
central government transfers. As Luttmer and Singhal have shown, ‘tax 
morale’, or intrinsic motivations to comply with tax demands based on 
factors such as citizens’ relationship to the state, and ideals of  reciprocity, 
is an important element in the success of  any taxation system (Luttmer 
and Singhal 2014). In the Ghanaian DAs, each community – indeed 
each individual voter – wants to pay the equivalent of  a ‘hypothecated’ 
tax in which the community will get back what it paid as a specific 
service or project for their particular community. They do not want to 
fund benefits for other communities. This attitude was actually reinforced 
by a government decision to introduce ‘local rebate’ schemes, according 
to which a proportion of  locally collected taxes was returned to the Area 
or Zonal Councils in which they were collected on a pro rata basis. The 
problem was also exacerbated in the early years of  the Assemblies by the 
contradictory official roles of  the AMs.
On the one hand, they were supposed to encourage payment of  
local direct taxes (flat levies or ‘poll taxes’, market and lorry park 
tolls, property taxes) which were justified in terms of  the necessity for 
collective development resources; citizens were told that development 
progress depended upon them paying their taxes. In the case study 
districts, AMs took part in ‘pay your tax’ campaigns alongside Rawlings’ 
CDR militants, who used increasingly heavy-handed methods in 
local markets. In Africa, both the association of  direct taxation with 
colonialism, and the poor past performance of  local government 
made it especially difficult to persuade citizens of  the ‘rightness’ – and 
benefits – of  paying their taxes. Yet AMs ended up being accused by 
the government officials and CDR militants of  being ‘saboteurs’ of  
government policy when tax collection did not meet targets (Crook 
and Manor 1998: 221). When the promises made by AMs that paying 
taxes would lead to funding of  local projects were routinely unfulfilled, 
encouraging tax payment became even more difficult.
On the other hand, AMs were supposed to lead local, self-help-based 
community development efforts as a way to bolster their own popularity 
and legitimacy. They knew they would ultimately be judged on their 
success in ‘bringing development’ to their wards. For citizens, this 
could be seen as a double jeopardy; they were told they had to pay 
their taxes in order to sustain the development programme of  the local 
government. But when they requested specific projects they were told 
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they had to organise their own self-help, which could also involve paying 
locally agreed project levies. This led AMs to increasingly withdraw 
from encouraging payment of  tax, and instead to focus mainly on 
self-help projects, with whatever help they could get from other patrons.4
The longer-term consequences for the DAs of  these interactions 
between intensely local community representation and shortage of  
resources have been on balance very negative.
2.6 Decline in participation and increasing distrust of District Assemblies
In the first place, disillusionment on the part of  both citizens and 
representatives rapidly set in. In spite of  the good initial improvements 
in participation, by 1992, 3.71 per cent of  respondents in the case 
study districts felt that the Assembly ‘could not meet their needs’, a 
view amply proven by comparing the actual outputs of  the Assemblies 
with citizens’ statements on what they saw as the main developmental 
priorities for their communities (Crook and Manor 1998). Twenty-two 
years later, little had changed; a national survey by Ghana’s Center for 
Democratic Development (CDD) found that 65 per cent of  citizens did 
not trust the DAs and gave poor ratings to their performance in key 
areas of  public service provision (Ayee, Ahwoi and Deku 2014: 152). 
Participation in local elections declined, from 58 per cent in 1989 to 
41 per cent in 1998, and has continued to fall since (Crook 1999). 
Worse, the most recent assessments have confirmed that the sub-district 
structures – Town, Area and Zonal Councils, and Unit Committees 
– which were supposed to be the core of  grass-roots participation – 
remain for the most part ‘paper’ institutions which have never really 
been activated (Ayee et al. 2014: 71). When elections for the Unit 
Committees finally took place in 1998, 65 per cent were uncontested. 
The initial cohorts of  elected AMs also lost heart: by 1994, only one 
third on average of  the original AMs stood for re-election, and it has 
since proven consistently difficult, except in the main urban areas, to 
secure good candidates for the Assemblies.
2.7 Political pressure to increase central government funding, decline in 
local revenue mobilisation
Secondly, there has been little or no progress in improving local revenue 
mobilisation. The political and administrative difficulties outlined 
previously, combined with the increasingly powerful clientelist basis of  
local and national politics, have led to continual increases in central 
government transfers to the local government system, both in absolute 
and proportionate terms. Before the DA reform, Ghana’s District 
Councils, which were administratively run, received between 24 and 
43 per cent of  their revenues from central government transfers. In the 
first few years of  the DA system, when central government transfers 
came primarily from ceded revenues, salary payments and earmarked 
grants, central government funding continued to account for around 
40–50 per cent of  total revenues (although this actually declined 
somewhat in the two case study districts) (Crook and Manor 1998). 
A major change occurred with the introduction of  the DACF in 1994; 
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initially set at 5 per cent of  national revenues, political pressure led to 
the fund being increased to 7.5 per cent in 2008 after the election of  
the NPP government (Gilbert et al. 2013). The NDC regime (which 
lost office in December 2016) was considering increasing this to 10 per 
cent. Over the past 20 years, funding for the DAs coming from the 
DACF has resulted in a tenfold increase in central funds compared to 
the former ceded revenues system. The increases have been especially 
significant over the 2008–13 period (see Table 2). In 2008, total central 
government and external funding accounted for between 74 per cent 
(largest quintile by population) and 93 per cent (smallest quintile by 
population) of  total revenues, the differences reflecting the equalisation 
formulae (Gilbert et al. 2013). (The three big cities, Accra, Kumasi and 
Tema, received 59 per cent, 68 per cent and 47 per cent respectively 
Table 2 DACF yearly allocations, 1994–2013 (in million Ghana cedis)
Year Actual amount (million GHS) % Increase/decrease
1994 2.60 -
1995 5.40 106.46
1996 7.80 44.31
1997 7.90 1.28
1998 15.53 96.48
1999 11.24 (-27.6)
2000 14.95 33.01
2001 18.87 26.22
2002 26.53 40.6
2003 64.86 144.42
2004 85.86 32.17
2005 70.19 (-18.11)
2006 139.16 98.2
2007 173.34 6.63
2008 217.01 46.24
2009 188.57 (-13.11)
2010 340.40 80.52
2011 392.96 43.32
2012 571.70 45.49
2013 648.13 13.36
Total 3,072.89 -
Source Ayee (2014).
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from central government transfers.) Latest estimates suggest that the 
proportions are between 80 and 99 per cent (Ayee 2014).
As noted, this significant and continuing growth in central funding has 
raised the average annual per capita revenue for all DAs to between 
US$5 and US$10 – still not very impressive, given the responsibilities 
of  the district and Metropolitan governments. At the same time, local 
revenue mobilisation continues to experience the same difficulties 
and remains weak. One indication is the persistence of  unrealistic 
budget estimating, whereby every year DAs set budgets based upon 
estimates of  revenue collection which are never achieved, often by huge 
margins. In the two case studies, the gap between revenue estimates 
and actual revenues in the early 1990s was routinely between 200 and 
400 per cent. In 2014, it was calculated that the actual revenues of  all 
Assemblies were only 37 per cent of  budget estimates (Ayee et al. 2014).
An example of  the difficulties is to be found in the poll tax or ‘flat basic 
rate’, a legacy from the colonial era which Assemblies have retained 
and still attempt to collect. It is usually a very small, even token amount 
(Ayee suggests it is typically the equivalent of  £0.10), but collection 
rates are very low – in the case studies, the revenue figures showed 
that only around 12–14 per cent of  the adult population were paying 
the tax. Nevertheless, an official report on the performance of  the 
decentralisation programme still recommends that the tax be retained, 
but at a more useful level (for example, the equivalent of  one day of  
the official minimum daily wage), on the grounds that it provides an 
accountability link between the provision of  services and payment of  
tax (Ayee et al. 2014). Clearly, the fundamental political difficulties at the 
root of  local revenue mobilisation have not been addressed, given the 
context of  ever-increasing pressures to provide central funding. Such a 
centrally-dominated system can be seen as an important element in the 
control of  patronage which permeates the democratic political system, 
side by side with the laudable goal of  providing realistic and adequate 
funding for the decentralised authorities.
3 Would a different kind of representation and electoral system work 
better?
If  the community basis of  representation on large district governments 
creates such deep problems, would a different form of  democratic 
representation work better? Côte d’Ivoire introduced a ‘Francophone’-
style local government system between 1985 and 1996, based on 
‘communes’. The distinguishing feature of  the commune system is that it is 
based on an urban conception of  local government, in which each town 
is made a self-governing unit, incorporating only a small surrounding 
rural area. By 1996, Côte d’Ivoire had 196 communes, the majority of  
which had populations of  less than 20,000. Each is run by an executive 
mayor who is elected by the winning council at its first meeting. A closed 
list system of  election is used which means that the councillors do not 
officially have any constituency responsibility or ‘community’ link. But 
the ratio of  representation is even closer and more ‘grass roots’ than 
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that of  Ghana: 1:1,000 on average, with ratios of  1:400 more common 
in the smaller communes such as the four studied in the 1990s (Crook 
and Manor 1998).
Unfortunately, the Ivorian list system does not work any better than 
single-member wards for encouraging local democratic responsibility and 
collective action including local revenue mobilisation for development. 
A survey of  local residents revealed that 58 per cent could not name any 
elected councillors, whilst 90 per cent could name the mayor (Crook 
and Manor 1998). The political logic of  the list means that most mayors 
are elite political entrepreneurs who put together their list before the 
election; they are his supporters and if  the list is victorious will elect the 
patron mayor as expected. Worse, the list election is a ‘winner takes all’, 
so the winning list takes control of  the commune council and there is no 
representation of  any opposition. This means that collecting local taxes 
and even special levies for agreed commune projects is difficult because 
those who did not vote for the winning list and its mayor do not consider 
themselves in any way obliged to contribute. In one commune studied, 
a project to build a much-needed secondary school for the area had to 
be abandoned as it was impossible to collect sufficient funds through 
a commune special levy, even though the prefect was enlisted to try to 
enforce it. The mindset of  Ivorian local electors is very much focused on 
central or national politics; they see ‘development’ as something which 
the mayor, as a big ‘patron’, should bring to the locality through his 
political connections with capital city politicians and officials.
4 Conclusions
The issues emerging from the experiences of  decentralised government 
in Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire and Uganda, as well as Africa more generally, 
suggest that representative local democracy does not necessarily lead to 
improved local revenue mobilisation, particularly where it involves any 
form of  direct or individual taxation. Indirect taxation is probably easier 
to collect but still does not deal with the problem of  how to give greater 
legitimacy to resource allocation decisions by an elected council, where 
there is little or no sense of  a collective public good at that level of  
action. Neither single-member electoral representation of  communities 
on a ‘no-party’ basis, nor party list elections seem to work well, within 
the context of  a national political system dominated by competitive 
clientelism.
Competitive party competition at local level could perhaps help to 
aggregate a broader sense of  collective interest, but can also lead to an 
even stronger sense of  exclusion and resentment if  resources are denied 
to communities which voted for the losing party, as happens in many 
countries. In India, which has a nationwide system of  local democratic 
governments, what does seem to work better is the presence of  real 
opposition, which can challenge the most blatant examples of  clientelist 
allocation of  resources; this, combined with the very high rate of  
turnover in Indian elections (ruling parties at state level were thrown out 
after one term in over 70 per cent of  elections, 1980–2008) has led to the 
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emergence of  ‘post-clientelist’ initiatives in which politicians try to appeal 
to broader groups of  voters with generic development programmes 
(Manor 2016). In India, such approaches are further encouraged by the 
enormous increase in national funding resources handed down to local 
governments by anti-poverty programmes such as the National Education 
Guarantee Programme and the National Rural Employment Guarantee. 
These initiatives can of  course feed local patronage politics; but active 
democratic competition and popular accountability initiatives can help 
to make them into tools of  broader developmental initiatives. There is 
some evidence that this may be starting to happen in parts of  Africa as 
well (van de Walle 2012); but the continuing dominance of  clientelist 
politics means that it is still very difficult to establish the legitimacy of  
local taxation. It may be argued, therefore, that attempting to increase 
the proportion of  local government revenues deriving from local taxation 
faces many obstacles, and is not necessarily helped by the current form of  
democratic electoral politics in Ghana. Central government transfers are, 
therefore, likely to remain the fairest and most effective way of  funding 
local government in Africa for some time to come.
Notes
* This article uses material from research on local government in West 
Africa and South Asia funded by the British Overseas Development 
Administration (now Department for International Development, 
DFID). The views expressed are those of  the author and should not 
be attributed to DFID.
1 See Cabral (2011) for a useful summary of  the main arguments for 
(and against) democratic decentralisation more generally.
2 Some scholars nonetheless remain puzzled that democracy has not 
produced more redistributive policies; Ardanaz and Scartascini’s 
(2011) study of  Argentine fiscal federalism explains it in terms of  the 
‘overrepresentation’ of  richer districts in the national parliament. 
But this simply transfers the same argument to parliamentary 
representation, on the assumption that government policy will 
somehow directly reflect the interests represented in parliament. But 
there is little evidence that parliaments in either South American or 
African democracies have much influence on policymaking or policy 
implementation (see Barkan 2010).
3 In the early 1990s, the per capita development expenditure in East 
Akim and East Mamprusi districts was the equivalent of  US$0.18 
and US$0.45; even by 2008, after substantial increases in central 
funding, the average per capita revenue of  all the Assemblies was 
only US$5.31, and US$10.62 for the smallest/poorest quintile (2012 
exchange rates) (Crook and Manor 1998; Gilbert et al. 2013).
4 In one of  the case study districts, respondents identified 66 per cent 
of  the projects which had been started in their villages as ‘self-help’; 
but 71 per cent were dissatisfied with them because few ever got 
completed (Crook and Manor 1998: 255).
IDS Bulletin Vol. 48 No. 2 March 2017: ‘Interrogating Decentralisation in Africa’ 15–30 | 29
Institute of Development Studies | bulletin.ids.ac.uk
References
Ardanaz, M. and Scartascini, C. (2011) Why Don’t We Tax the Rich? 
Inequality, Legislative Malapportionment, and Personal Income Taxation 
around the World, Working Paper IDB-WP-282, Washington DC: 
Inter-American Development Bank
Ayee, Joseph R.A. (2014) ‘Socio-Economic Impact of  Gold Mining on 
Local Communities in Africa: The Ghana Case Study’, consultancy 
report for World Bank, unpublished, Accra
Ayee, Joseph R.A.; Ahwoi, K. and Deku, K. (2014) ‘Review of  
Decentralization Reforms in Ghana: Aide Memoire of  the Joint 
Decentralization Review Mission’, report commissioned by the 
Government of  Ghana Inter-Ministerial Coordinating Committee 
(IMCC) on Decentralization and the Development Partners, 
unpublished, Accra
Aziz, A. and Arnold, D.D. (eds) (1996) Decentralised Governance in Asian 
Countries, Thousand Oaks CA: Sage
Bahl, R. and Linn, J. (1994) ‘Fiscal Decentralization and Intergovernmental 
Transfers in Less Developed Countries’, Publius – The Journal of  Federalism 
24.1: 1–19
Barkan, J. (2010) ‘Legislatures on the Rise?’, in Larry Diamond and 
Marc F. Plattner (eds), Democratization in Africa: Progress and Retreat, 
Baltimore MA: The Johns Hopkins Press
Bird, R. (1994) ‘Decentralizing Infrastructure: For Good or For Ill’, 
background paper for World Development Report 1994, Washington DC: 
World Bank
Booth, D. (2012) Development as a Collective Action Problem: Addressing the 
Real Challenges of  African Governance, London: Overseas Development 
Institute (ODI), Africa Power and Politics Programme,  
www.institutions-africa.org (accessed 17 January 2017)
Brautigam, D.; Fjeldstad, O-H. and Moore, M. (eds) (2008) Taxation 
and State Building in Developing Countries, New York NY: Cambridge 
University Press
Cabral, L. (2011) Decentralisation in Africa: Scope, Motivations and Impact on 
Service Delivery and Poverty, Future Agricultures Working Paper 020, 
London: Overseas Development Institute (ODI)
Crook, R.C. (1999) ‘No-Party Politics and Local Democracy in 
Africa: Rawlings’ Ghana and the Ugandan Model in the 1990s’, 
Democratization 6.4:114–38
Crook, R.C. and Manor, J. (1998) Democracy and Decentralisation in 
South Asia and West Africa: Participation, Accountability and Performance, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Dafflon, B. (2013) ‘Institutional and Fiscal Decentralization: Blueprint 
for an Analytical Guide’, in Bernard Dafflon and Thierry Madiès 
(eds), The Political Economy of  Decentralization in Africa, African 
Development Forum Series, Washington DC: World Bank
Davey, K.J. (1994) ‘Local Resource Generation: Role and Potential’, 
in Donald Rothchild (ed.), Strengthening African Local Initiative: Local 
Self-Governance, Decentralisation and Accountability, Hamburg: Institut für 
Afrika Kunde
30 | Crook Democratic Decentralisation, Clientelism and Local Taxation in Ghana
Vol. 48 No. 2 March 2017: ‘Interrogating Decentralisation in Africa’
Gervasoni, C. (2010) ‘A Rentier Theory of  Subnational Regimes: Fiscal 
Federalism, Democracy, and Authoritarianism in the Argentine 
Provinces’, World Politics 62.02: 302–40
Gilbert, G.; Hugounenq, R. and Vaillancourt, F. (2013) ‘Local Public 
Finances in Ghana’, in Bernard Dafflon and Thierry Madiès (eds), 
The Political Economy of  Decentralization in Africa, African Development 
Forum Series, Washington DC: World Bank
Golooba-Mutebi, F. (2005) ‘When Popular Participation Won’t Improve 
Service Provision: Primary Health Care in Uganda’, Development 
Policy Review 23.2: 165–84
Keefer, Philip and Khemani, Stuti (2005) ‘Democracy, Public 
Expenditures and the Poor: Understanding Political Incentives for 
Providing Public Services’, World Bank Research Observer 20.1: 1–27
Levy, B. and Kpundeh, S. (eds) (2004) Building State Capacity in Africa: 
New Approaches, Emerging Lessons, Washington DC: World Bank
Lindberg, S. (2010) Some Evidence on the Demand Side of  Private–Public 
Goods Provision by MPs, Working Paper 8, London: Overseas 
Development Institute (ODI), Africa Power and Politics Programme, 
www.institutions-africa.org (accessed 17 January 2017)
Lindberg, S. (2009) Member of  the Parliament of  Ghana: A Hybrid Institution 
with Mixed Effects, Working Paper 2, London: Overseas Development 
Institute (ODI), Africa Power and Politics Programme,  
www.institutions-africa.org (accessed 17 January 2017)
Lindberg, S. (2003) ‘ “It’s Our Time to ‘Chop’ ”: Do Elections in Africa 
Feed Neo-Patrimonialism Rather than Counteract it?’, Democratization 
10.2: 121–40
Luttmer, E.F.P. and Singhal, M. (2014) ‘Tax Morale’, Journal of  Economic 
Perspectives 28.4: 149–68
Manor, James (2016) ‘Beyond Clientelism: Digvijay Singh in Madhya 
Pradesh’, in James Manor, The Writings of  James Manor: Politics and 
State–Society Relations in India, Hyderabad: Orient Black Swan
Tanzi, V. (1995) ‘Fiscal Federalism and Decentralisation: A Review of  
Some Efficiency and Macro-Economic Aspects’, paper presented at 
the Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics, 
May, Washington DC
van de Walle, N. (2012) ‘The Path from Neopatrimonialism: Democracy 
and Clientelism in Africa Today’, in Daniel C. Bach and M. Gazibo 
(eds), Neopatrimonialism in Africa and Beyond, Abingdon and New York 
NY: Routledge
Vicente, P.C. and Wantchekon, L. (2009) ‘Clientelism and Vote Buying: 
Lessons from Field Experiments in African Elections’, Oxford Review 
of  Economic Policy 25.2: 292–305
Whitfield, Lindsay (2011) Competitive Clientelism, Easy Financing and Weak 
Capitalists: The Contemporary Political Settlement in Ghana, DIIS/EPP 
Working Paper 2011, Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International 
Studies: 27
World Bank (2004) World Development Report 2004: Making Services Work 
for Poor People, Washington DC: World Bank
